For therapists, supporting someone with chronic illness may require clinical listening that makes room for uncertainty, changing identity, losses without clear endings, and other experiences of healthcare itself that may have left psychological wounds.
Related articles: Emotional Freedom Technique (EFT) for Chronic Pain, Case Study: Multiple Losses as a Caregiver, Why Uncertainty Feels So Difficult: The Hidden Psychology of Existential Anxiety.
Jump to section
- Introduction
- When the familiar map no longer works
- The losses that do not quite end
- “Who am I now?”
- When your experience is not believed
- When healthcare becomes part of the wound
- Resisting the urge to fix
- Conclusion: Making room for a life, not just an illness
- Key takeaways
- Questions therapists often ask
- References
Introduction
A client stops making plans more than a few days ahead because she never knows what her body will allow.
A second watches colleagues progress in careers he once imagined sharing, while insisting that he does not want therapy to become another place where he is expected to “process his grief”.
Another has spent years seeking an explanation for persistent symptoms. After medical appointments in which she felt repeatedly dismissed, she now prepares obsessively for consultations and becomes highly anxious when a clinician says her test results are normal.
A fourth says simply, “I don’t know who I am anymore.”
For therapists accustomed to working towards change, chronic illness can present an unusual clinical challenge. Sometimes there are important patterns to change: avoidance, self-criticism, isolation or coping strategies that have begun to constrict a person’s life. But sometimes the reality causing distress cannot be therapeutically resolved. The body may remain unpredictable. Pain may continue. Capacity may fluctuate. Prognosis may be uncertain. Roles may genuinely have been lost.
Chronic illness can therefore unsettle things ordinarily taken for granted: confidence in the body, expectations about the future, and even a person’s understanding of who they are. Research suggests that illness identity and illness uncertainty can both be associated with psychological adjustment, although people’s experiences and meanings vary considerably (Pelters, 2024; Shneider et al., 2024; Skojec et al., 2025). This means therapists may need to begin somewhere slightly different from the familiar question, How can I help this person cope better? An earlier question may be more important: What is it like to live inside this particular reality?
When the familiar map no longer works
Chronic illness is not a single psychological experience. Even two people with the same diagnosis may understand its place in their lives very differently. Yet illness can make previously ordinary assumptions less dependable: that plans can be made, effort will bear some relationship to achievement, rest will restore energy, or tomorrow’s body will possess roughly today’s capacities.
Uncertainty can therefore become part of the environment in which life is organised. An integrative review found greater illness uncertainty associated with poorer psychological adjustment, with appraisal and coping appearing important in that relationship (Skojec et al., 2025).
For some clients, uncertainty concerns prognosis: Will this become worse? For others, it concerns treatment: Will anything help? And for someone whose condition fluctuates, the timescale may be much shorter: Will I be able to work tomorrow? Attend the wedding next month? Make dinner tonight?
This can complicate formulation. A client who stops making commitments may appear avoidant. Sometimes avoidance will indeed be part of the problem. But perhaps committing to activities has repeatedly meant cancellation, symptom exacerbation, or disappointing others. Good formulation asks not only what a behaviour costs, but what problem it has been trying to solve. That same curiosity becomes important when uncertainty begins to reshape the person’s experience of loss.
The losses that do not quite end
Grief is usually associated with something that is gone. Chronic illness can be stranger than that. A person may lose the ability to work full-time but remain able to work sometimes. A period of relative wellness may make old possibilities seem available again, only for another flare, relapse, or deterioration to alter the landscape. What, exactly, has been lost? Sometimes the answer keeps changing.
The concept of ambiguous loss can provide a useful lens here. Boss and Couden (2002) applied ambiguous-loss theory to chronic physical illness, observing that uncertain prognosis, changing physical condition, and fluctuating capability can blur the boundaries of what is present and absent. Ambiguous loss is a lens, not a diagnosis, and it need not describe everyone with chronic illness. Where it does resonate, however, it offers an alternative to the assumption that grief should move steadily towards resolution. A person may repeatedly encounter the distance between the life they expected, the life that remains possible, and the life their body permits today.
Some losses are readily visible: employment, income, mobility, or independence. Others are quieter – spontaneity, privacy, confidence in one’s body, an imagined future, or the assumption that ordinary activities do not require calculation. And some may barely be recognised by others as losses.
Related chronic-illness literature has described chronic sorrow: recurrent rather than continuously present grief-related feelings associated with an ongoing disparity created by loss (Eakes et al., 1998; Lindgren et al., 1992). A former athlete may feel relatively settled about changed capacity until friends complete an event they once trained for together. A further deterioration may require adaptation to something the person thought they had already learned to live with.
The return of sadness does not necessarily mean previous adaptation has failed. A renewed wave of grief may simply be a response to a renewed encounter with loss.
Fluctuating illness can make even improvement emotionally complicated. A good day may be delightful and simultaneously remind someone of what has become less available. Remission can permit hope while making possible deterioration frightening again. The therapist need not resolve these apparent contradictions. Pleasure and grief, adaptation and anger, hope and fear can coexist.
Nor should recognising loss turn every chronically ill client into a griever. Not every change is experienced as loss, and not every difficulty belongs inside the individual. Someone may need support to mourn lost physical capacity while also needing workplace accommodation. They may need help living with uncertainty while also needing clearer medical communication.
Therapy therefore needs to hold two questions: What has this person lost or had to relinquish? And: What have they been unnecessarily prevented from retaining, accessing or becoming? That distinction becomes especially important when loss begins to touch identity.
“Who am I now?”
Loss concerns what has changed. Identity raises another question: What do those changes mean for the person I understand myself to be?
Bury (1982) famously described chronic illness as biographical disruption: an experience that can disturb assumptions about the body, everyday life, and the future, requiring reconsideration of biography and self. Later scholarship complicated that account, showing that illness can sometimes involve biographical continuity rather than rupture, particularly where adversity, disability, or poor health is already woven into someone’s life (Locock et al., 2009; Williams, 2000).
The distinction matters because therapists should not assume identity disruption merely because illness is present. The client may be thinking, I don’t recognise myself anymore. Or they may be saying, I am exactly the same person, and I wish everyone would stop treating me as though my diagnosis changed that.
Illness can nevertheless reveal how much identity has rested upon particular roles:
- I am a surgeon.
- I am the one who takes care of everyone.
- I am an athlete.
- I am independent.
When illness makes such roles difficult or impossible, more than activity may be affected. Work may have carried competence and belonging; caring for others may have expressed love or purpose; physical independence may have been central to self-understanding.
Contemporary reviews support the importance of illness-identity processes while also finding considerable variation in how they are conceptualised (Pelters, 2024; Shneider et al., 2024). One useful concept is engulfment, in which illness becomes dominant within identity and crowds out other roles. Greater engulfment has generally been associated with poorer outcomes (Shneider et al., 2024).
Yet therapists should be cautious here too. A client who talks extensively about illness is not necessarily overidentified with it. Symptoms may genuinely affect almost every decision. They may be newly diagnosed. Perhaps nobody elsewhere lets them talk about it. Or healthcare systems may require them to repeatedly narrate illness simply to receive care.
The amount of conversational space illness occupies does not necessarily tell us how much identity space it occupies. Nor is greater identification with illness necessarily undesirable. For some people, identifying as chronically ill or disabled may bring community, self-understanding, or relief from years of interpreting reduced capacity as personal failure.
Therapy can also become overly invested in constructing a “new self”. Questions about growth and meaning may be fruitful for some people, but can imply that suffering ought eventually to produce an improved person. Illness does not owe anyone character development.
Sometimes the work involves recognising continuity. The athlete unable to compete may still value challenge and movement. Someone unable to continue a profession may retain curiosity, expertise, or a desire to contribute. Exploring the distinction between role and underlying value can create space without pretending the role itself did not matter: What did doing that allow you to express about who you are? The answer may reveal something that remains available in another form – or something genuinely irreplaceable.
Similarly, helping someone “get back to their old self” may be exactly what they long for, or it may turn the pre-illness self into a benchmark against which the present person continually falls short. Perhaps the therapeutic task is neither to retrieve an old self nor manufacture a new one. It is to help the client retain authorship. That authorship becomes especially important when clients repeatedly encounter another experience: telling people what is happening in their bodies and not feeling believed.
When your experience is not believed
Living with chronic illness often requires people to become careful observers of their bodies. They notice patterns in symptoms, exertion, medication, energy, and pain. This does not make someone their own physician. Clinical expertise, diagnostic testing, and medical judgment remain essential. But it does make the person an important source of evidence about their own experience.
A substantial body of research now documents illness invalidation: experiences in which people’s symptoms, limitations, or accounts of illness are discounted or insufficiently recognised. In an Australian study of 1,610 adults managing chronic physical-health symptoms, invalidation by medical professionals, family members, and partners was independently associated with greater psychological distress (Woldhuis & Gandy, 2024).
A meta-synthesis of 151 qualitative reports involving more than 11,000 people across chronic conditions similarly identified consequences of symptom invalidation including shame and distress, healthcare-related anxiety and trauma, healthcare avoidance, and diagnostic delay (Bontempo et al., 2025).
Repeated invalidation may also affect self-trust.
- Maybe the pain isn’t really that bad.
- Perhaps I am just weak.
- What if I am making too much of this?
Alternatively, someone may become increasingly vigilant: documenting symptoms extensively, rehearsing arguments before appointments, or feeling compelled to establish incontrovertible evidence before expecting to be believed.
The concept of epistemic injustice helps illuminate what may be happening. Broadly, it describes circumstances in which someone is unfairly disadvantaged in their capacity as a knower. A systematic review found growing application of the concept in healthcare, including situations where patients’ testimony or experiential knowledge receives insufficient weight (Côté et al., 2024).
This does not mean patients are always correct about the medical explanation for symptoms. A person can accurately know that something is happening while being mistaken about why it is happening. Equally, a clinician can be appropriately uncertain about diagnosis while communicating that uncertainty in ways the patient experiences as dismissive.
Respecting patients as knowers need not eliminate legitimate clinical questioning or disagreement (Byrne, 2020). The therapist therefore need not determine whose medical interpretation is correct. The more relevant question may be: What happened psychologically when this person felt that their account of their own experience could not be trusted?
Medical gaslighting – or medical invalidation?
Clients may describe such experiences as medical gaslighting, but the term remains conceptually unsettled. Recent reviews find inconsistency in how medical gaslighting, medical invalidation, and related constructs are defined and measured (Fuss et al., 2024; Lerch & Stille, 2026). Gaslighting traditionally implies more than disagreement or disbelief; it involves manipulation that undermines another person’s confidence in their perception of reality. Not every rushed consultation, diagnostic error, poor explanation, or disagreement between clinician and patient meets that threshold.
Medical invalidation therefore provides a broader and currently better-established concept for experiences in which symptoms, concerns, or experiential knowledge are discounted or insufficiently acknowledged. Therapists need not correct clients who use the term gaslighting, nor decide whether another professional acted appropriately based on an encounter they did not witness.
Instead, they can separate validation from agreement. Compare: “Your doctor was wrong. You know your body better than anyone.” with: “You have been experiencing symptoms that frighten you, and not having an explanation – particularly when you have felt dismissed – has made it difficult to trust both healthcare and your own judgement.”
The second response does not adjudicate the medicine. It recognises the person. Self-trust need not mean I am unquestionably right. It might instead mean: I am entitled to take my experience seriously while remaining curious about what it means.
And there is an uncomfortable implication for therapists here: we can invalidate too. A client’s fear of deterioration can be labelled catastrophising before realistic risks have been explored. Repeated healthcare seeking may be interpreted as reassurance-seeking without understanding whether the person has ever received an adequate assessment or explanation.
Even an entirely legitimate therapeutic question – “Could there be another interpretation?” – may be heard by someone with a long history of invalidation as: You don’t believe me either. This does not mean abandoning psychological inquiry. It means attending to timing, formulation and relational context.
The task is neither unquestioning affirmation nor sceptical interrogation. It is epistemic humility: recognising that therapists possess psychological expertise while clients possess knowledge of lives, bodies, and histories therapists have not inhabited.
For some clients, however, healthcare experiences have left more than frustration or diminished trust. Not every invalidating medical encounter is traumatic. But some medical experiences are.
When healthcare becomes part of the wound
Illness itself can be frightening. So can the care required to treat it. Medical procedures may involve pain, loss of bodily control, invasive interventions, frightening diagnoses, or genuine threats to life. Treatment can require repeated exposure to situations from which people would ordinarily be free to withdraw. For someone living with chronic illness, moreover, the source of threat may not lie safely in the past: further procedures, deterioration, or hospitalisation may remain possible.
Research supports recognising illness, injury, and medical intervention as potential sources of traumatic stress. Post-traumatic stress symptoms and PTSD have been documented following a range of medical events, although prevalence varies substantially across populations and circumstances (Cyr et al., 2021). Recent clinical scholarship also emphasises distinctive features of medical trauma, including ongoing bodily reminders and the possibility of continued contact with healthcare environments associated with threat (McBain & Cordova, 2024).
This can make apparently ordinary healthcare experiences powerful triggers. A waiting room, hospital smell, blood-pressure cuff, or notification of test results may evoke fear before the person has consciously identified why. Some clients may avoid appointments; others may become intensely vigilant during them.
Yet not every frightening, painful, or invalidating healthcare encounter is traumatic, and distress should not automatically be translated into a trauma formulation. Anger, mistrust, sadness, and apprehension may be proportionate responses to difficult experiences without indicating PTSD. The relevant question is not simply, Was this medical experience objectively bad enough to be traumatic? It is: What happened to this person during the experience, and what happens in them now when something brings it back?
Where traumatic stress is present, therapists may need to work with an unusual reality: the aim cannot always be to help the nervous system recognise that the danger is over. Sometimes another procedure really is coming.
Trauma-informed therapy in this context may therefore involve helping clients distinguish past threat, present safety, and realistic future threat rather than treating all anticipatory fear as a residue of the past. It may also involve restoring choice wherever choice is possible: preparing for appointments, identifying triggers, discussing ways of communicating needs, and supporting the client to regain some sense of agency within healthcare encounters.
The broader therapeutic approaches to this work deserve their own discussion. But before choosing an intervention, there is another variable worth considering. The therapist.
Resisting the urge to fix
Sitting with chronic illness can be difficult for helpers. Psychotherapists are trained to facilitate change. We listen for patterns, formulate problems, and consider what might reduce suffering. Chronic illness sometimes confronts us with suffering that cannot simply be treated away.
That can create an understandable urge to find something to offer. Perhaps the client could reframe the situation. Practise acceptance. Focus on what remains possible. Find meaning. Challenge catastrophic thoughts. Notice what illness has taught them. Any of these may eventually be valuable. Offered too early, however, they can communicate something quite different: Please find a way to feel better about this. The therapist’s discomfort with helplessness can then become another burden for the client to carry.
Acceptance is particularly vulnerable to misunderstanding. A person can psychologically accommodate the reality of illness while continuing to dislike it, protest against unnecessary restrictions, pursue treatment, and hope circumstances improve. Similarly, finding meaning can be deeply important when meaning emerges from the client’s experience; it becomes problematic when suffering is expected to produce wisdom.
Therapists may therefore need to tolerate some therapeutic incompleteness. There may be no satisfying reframe for missing an important event because pain became unbearable. No hidden benefit to another loss of function. No cognitive distortion underlying the fear that a progressive condition may progress.
Sometimes the work begins with sufficiently spacious acknowledgement: This is difficult. It matters. We do not yet have to make it mean anything else. That stance is not therapeutic passivity. It creates the conditions under which genuine choice may eventually become visible.
Conclusion: Making room for a life, not just an illness
Chronic illness asks something unusual of psychotherapy. It asks us to recognise suffering without assuming pathology; loss without automatically prescribing grief; identity change without demanding reinvention; patient knowledge without pretending medical expertise is irrelevant; and frightening healthcare experiences without turning every difficult encounter into trauma.
Above all, it asks for curiosity. The client may want help accepting what cannot be changed – or fighting for something that can. They may want to grieve a former life, reclaim continuity with it, or stop talking about illness altogether. They may discover meaning in what has happened or consider the suggestion that they should find meaning profoundly irritating.
Our task is not to decide which response represents successful adaptation. It is to help create enough psychological room for clients to discover what living well means under the conditions of the life they actually have. Sometimes that will involve change. Sometimes accommodation. Sometimes protest. Sometimes grief.
And sometimes the most therapeutic thing we can offer is a relationship in which the person does not have to persuade us that their experience is real before we become curious about what it means. Perhaps, then, the question with which we began remains the most useful one: What is it like to live inside this particular reality? We may not be able to inhabit it ourselves. But we can learn to listen without deciding too quickly that we already understand.
Key takeaways
- Chronic illness can affect predictability, identity, relationships, roles, and trust in one’s body, but there is no single psychological experience of being chronically ill.
- Ambiguous loss can help therapists understand fluctuating or recurrent losses without assuming that every client should understand their experience through grief.
- Illness may disrupt identity, leave it largely continuous, or become integrated into a broader sense of self. Therapy should support the client’s authorship rather than prescribe a “new self”.
- Medical invalidation can affect psychological wellbeing and self-trust. Validating a client’s experience does not require therapists to endorse medical interpretations beyond their expertise.
- Medical events and healthcare experiences can contribute to traumatic stress, particularly when they involve threat, helplessness, or loss of control. However, not every difficult healthcare encounter is traumatic.
- Therapists may need to resist premature fixing, reframing, or meaning-making. Sometimes careful curiosity is itself an important intervention.
Questions therapists often ask
Q. How can I validate a client’s medical experience without reinforcing a belief that may be inaccurate?
A. Separate experience from explanation. You can validate pain, fear, uncertainty, frustration or the experience of feeling dismissed without confirming a medical conclusion you are not qualified to evaluate. “I can understand why that experience left you frightened and doubtful of yourself” validates something psychologically important without deciding what caused the symptoms.
Q. What if a client’s realistic health concerns look like catastrophising?
A. Explore the evidence and context before labelling the cognition. Chronic illness can involve genuine risks, unpredictable symptoms, and previous deterioration. The therapeutic question is not simply whether a thought is frightening, but whether the client’s appraisal is disproportionate to the available evidence – and whether the thought is helping them respond effectively to uncertainty.
Q. Should I encourage a client to accept their illness?
A. It may be more useful to explore what acceptance means to that particular client. Acceptance can mean acknowledging present reality without approving of it, abandoning treatment, relinquishing hope, or accepting avoidable barriers. ACT and other acceptance-based approaches can be valuable here, but acceptance should not become another standard of “good adjustment” that the client is expected to meet.
Q. How do I know whether a healthcare experience has become traumatic?
A. Listen for the client’s current response rather than relying solely on how objectively severe the event appears. Intrusive memories, avoidance, physiological reactivity, hypervigilance, and persistent changes in mood or cognition may warrant assessment for traumatic stress. Medical-event-related PTSD is documented across medical populations, although rates vary substantially by condition and circumstance (Cyr et al., 2021).
Q. What if I have never experienced serious chronic illness myself?
A. You do not need identical experience to offer useful therapy. You do need curiosity about what you cannot know from the inside. Ask rather than assume; learn enough about the condition to understand its likely practical context without positioning yourself as a medical expert; and remain alert to assumptions about productivity, independence, recovery, and what constitutes a worthwhile life.
References
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- Boss, P., & Couden, B. A. (2002). Ambiguous loss from chronic physical illness: Clinical interventions with individuals, couples, and families. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 58(11), 1351–1360. https://doi.org/10.1002/jclp.10083
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